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ABSTRACT
LUCIA BIRD: Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Power Sharing and External Support on
Separatist Violence
(Under the direction of Navin Bapat.)
Secessionist movements, when they resort to violence, can undermine the stability and
threaten the security of states. Institutional designs, like power sharing, that mitigate issues
associated with secessionism may be instrumental for states that contain potentially vio-
lent separatist groups. Strategies to share power include regional autonomy, which diffuses
power to local levels, and complex power sharing, which centralizes power among elites
at the national level. Support from external actors may prompt or further enable violent
rebellious activity from separatist groups, thus derailing the potentially pacifying effects of
these power sharing institutions. While past work has considered the impact of secessionist
activity on governance and foreign actors’ roles in intrastate conflict, this paper consid-
ers how these internal and external factors converge to influence rebellion. I contend that
secessionist activity is incited by both regional autonomy and complex power sharing, es-
pecially when foreign support is involved. To test these propositions, I employ quantitative
methods, specifically logistic regression. I find a positive and statistically significant re-
lationship between the interactions of political institutions with outside aid and secession,
which provides evidence for my theoretical propositions.
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Introduction
In early 2015, Crimean residents of eastern Ukraine overwhelmingly voted in favor of
a referendum to secede and join Russia. Demonstrations eventually culminated in Crimean
separatists’ declaration of independence from Ukraine and armed conflict between pro-
Russian separatist groups and the Ukrainian military (BBC 2014). After the fall of the So-
viet Union and Ukrainian independence, the central government of Ukraine granted Crimea
significant measures of autonomy in 1991 (Taylor 2014). Additionally, although schol-
arly and policy debate regarding the relationship between Crimean rebels and the Russian
state continues, allegations of outside support from Russia to Ukrainian rebels operating
in Crimea remain. This recent episode, which includes (likely) externally supported sepa-
ratists operating under a particular political institution designed to alleviate problems within
divided societies, illustrates the puzzle motivating this paper.
Theoretically, states have unchallenged sovereignty within their territory. Borrowing
from Weber, this suggests that, at a minimum, the government controls the use of armed
force within the legal boundaries of the state (1919). In reality, however, such sovereignty is
not always respected or maintained. Specifically, internal threats to sovereignty arise from
violent non-state actors that aim to reshape traditional national boundaries and shift some
amount of territory away from the central government and to the group itself or some other
state.
Separatists have a few options through which to achieve their goals, one of which is to
violently challenge the government. Two factors are likely to influence whether the group
employs violence in their rebellion efforts. First, the state with the separatist group can en-
act various power sharing options to maintain societal peace in a territory. Second, external
support to groups interested in secession may disrupt the peaceful societal equilibrium es-
tablished by the power sharing institutions in the state. These two factors will affect whether
separatists opt to violently rebel.
Two power sharing institutional models that governments may enact to face the threat of
secession include regional autonomy and complex power sharing. Past scholars in this vein
have considered the relationship between secession and power sharing arrangements, but
not specifically the impact of outside support and power sharing on outbreak of violence.
For example, Horowitz considers federalism in the Swiss context and finds that this form of
government is effective at reducing ethnic conflict (1985). Lijphart argues that India under
consociationalism was less violent, and conflict between societal groups increased as the
mechanisms to share power were undermined (1996). Conversely, Wilkinson directly con-
tradicts this claim by arguing that when violence levels were lower, India’s governmental
structure was not consociational (2000). As India has become increasingly a consociational
government, violence levels have actually increased (Wilkison 2000). Thus, in addition to
failing to agree on which type of power sharing arrangement incites or depresses intrastate
violence, scholars have failed to take into account the role of international actors in spark-
ing violent rebellion by separatists involved in such political institutions. So, this paper is
motivated by an academically interesting and policy relevant question: when can outside
support disrupt the societal equilibrium created by state institutions and trigger intrastate
conflict?
Power Sharing Options for the State
Two strategies that states can employ to maintain sovereignty in societies with multi-
ple social groups are repression or co-optation of the group into the polity. Co-optation
into the polity requires designing political institutions aimed at pacifying groups that might
potentially opt to secede. A government interested in maintaining the territorial and demo-
graphic composition of the state can forge a social contract to implement power sharing with
the separatist group. Two distinct institutional options to preserve the polity are complex
power sharing, which is often associated with consociationalism, and regional autonomy
(McGarry 2008).
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Complex power sharing refers to a political arrangement that allows some autonomy for
the substate group but is generally institutionally engineered to conciliate minority groups
in fragmented societies and thus may include elements ranging from consociationalism to
integration (Wolff 2009). McGarry observes that scholarship on complex power sharing is
closely connected to work on consociationalism (2008). Lijphart, the scholar perhaps most
linked with this institutional design, describes this form of power sharing as including one
or more of the following characteristics: representation in the government that integrates
the various groups in the state, some degree of autonomy for different societal groups, pro-
portional representation and financial allocations to the multiple groups in the state, and
the veto that protects groups’ basic interests and is to be used sparingly (1977). The con-
fessional democratic system in Lebanon that allows power sharing between Christians and
Muslims displays this type of institutional design (Dekmejian 1978). Specifically, complex
power sharing consists of a carefully designed distribution of power that prevents establish-
ment of political supremacy by certain religious, ethno-national, or other types of substate
groups (O’Leary 2008). This institutional design incentivizes collaboration among group
elites that have to work together after elections because they are forced to have a stake in
the central government. Conversely, other scholars argue that complex power sharing pro-
duces challenges regarding distribution of political benefits between ethnic groups because
elites bring their groups’ conflicts to a high level in the government and keep inflammatory
issues on the agenda (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Wolff asserts that complex power shar-
ing arrangements rely on the good will and capacity of elites, as well as their constituents
in respective societal groups, to properly function(2008). This suggests that the success of
complex power sharing can be undermined if group members hold extreme views. This
design also establishes some inflexibility in the central government because it institution-
alizes a normal, structured state of affairs that makes adapting to demographic or political
changes difficult (Roeder and Rothchild 2005).
Another form of power sharing that governments may offer to separatist groups is re-
gional autonomy. Ghai defines regional autonomy as a mechanism that provides substate
groups agency over issues that are germaine to the group but the central state to have some
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control over issues that are important to both the state as a whole and the individual group
(2000). This may be an effective strategy because it reduces the feelings of insecurity expe-
rienced by both members and elites of minority groups. Thus, devolving some authority to
the regional level will make these groups feel more secure by minimizing the possibilities
for risks associated with belonging to a minority (Posen 1993). Alternatively, Brancati cau-
tions that, while decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism by giving
groups control over their own administrative affairs, this may also increase ethnic conflict
and secessionism unintentionally by incentivizing the rise of regional parties (2006). Re-
gional parties contribute to outbreak of ethnic conflict and secessionism by emphasizing
sectarian identities. Such regional parties may advocate for public policies that show pref-
erence for certain ethnic groups and rally these groups into conflict and secession (Brancati
2006). The devolution of power to Scotland from the central government in the United
Kingdom exemplifies this power sharing structure (Sorens 2004).
The aforementioned strategies have strengths and weaknesses according to their struc-
turing of power and consequences of their implementation. Ideally, complex power sharing
allows for, or at least does not undermine, the legitimacy of the central government. This
institutional arrangement also incentivizes cross-group cooperation so that the government
can continue to function. For example, Norris notes that consociationalism, an aspect of
complex power sharing, leads to elite cooperation that is helpful in achieving stability and
democracy in divided societies (2005). Theoretically, this should be beneficial for states
trying to integrate separatist groups because it forces them to buy into the idea of the state
as a whole. Regional autonomy, conversely, weakens the strength of the central government
because power is devolved to groups in certain areas. This provides groups the opportunity
to prepare for violent secession by allowing space to mobilize resources and people for the
potential ensuing conflict with the central government.
These types of power sharing institutions have varying influences on the nature of seces-
sionist groups. Both complex power sharing and regional autonomy institutionalize societal
groups by establishing them as political units. This is because both of these institutions reaf-
firm individuals’ relationships to the primary group with which they identify. Since citizens
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are more likely to identify with their group rather than the nation as a whole, the authority
of the central government is undermined.
Furthermore, these power sharing structures essentially compel elites to associate with
their primary group of identification. Politically, the elites must win the approval and vote
of their constituents, who are the members of their groups. Complex power sharing may
unintentionally create moral hazard because the generation of political elites after those that
created the power sharing arrangement may compete among one another to rise above ri-
vals within their own group (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Such outbidding strategies may
include lip service for violent rebellion. For groups with regional autonomy, elites may
be forced to the extremes, such as support of violent behavior, to maintain support. Re-
gionally autonomous groups may also face fewer difficulties to mobilize for armed conflict
because they are already geographically concentrated and administratively independent,
making outbreak of violence likely.
States that contain multiple groups, some of which are interested in secession, may
reach a social equilibrium where power sharing institutions reflect the strategic situation
between the domestic actors. This social equilibrium, at least from the perspective of the
states, consists of peaceful interactions between politically relevant domestic actors. So,
states establish structures of regional autonomy and complex power sharing with the goal
of relieving pressure on the central government from dissatisfied social groups. Theoret-
ically, each power sharing option influences separatist groups’ objectives and strategies
differently. Regional autonomy is likely to aggravate existing tensions between different
societal groups. While complex power sharing ideally integrates social separatists into the
state, this design may also have inadvertent consequences in terms of functionality of the
government and bringing intergroup conflict to a high level of the government (Encarnacion
2004; Roeder and Rothchild 2005).
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External Support for Separatist Groups
While societal peace may be established through institutional design choices made by
the state, the resulting nonviolent interactions between domestic actors may be disrupted by
outside forces. Specifically, inflows of foreign support for separatist groups can encourage
rebellious behavior. Foreign support is aid, which may vary in nature and intensity, from
state actors to groups interested in seceding from the state (Byman 2013). Byman et al.
assert that the timing of such support is particularly important; for example, providing aid
to nascent rebel groups is likely to be significantly more influential than providing aid to
mature groups (2001a).
Since the end of the Cold War, 75% of violent conflicts have involved monetary and
administrative aid from states not directly engaged in the conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen
2005). During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the international system encouraged ex-
tensive support to rebel groups from the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold
War, however, outside support from the superpowers to violent substate groups decreased
significantly, leading to a parallel reduction in such groups’ capabilities generally (Kalyvas
and Balcells 2010). Regardless of the recent decrease in aid, Byman et al. suggest that
support from states, including those that are not superpowers, continues to be the most sig-
nificant type of aid that violent substate actors can receive (2013). Such foreign support
is likely to significantly increase the capacity of separatist groups, leading to increased vi-
olence and duration of the intrastate conflict (Regan 2000, 2002). Similarly, Libicki and
Connable observe that insurgents that receive state support are successful in over 50% of
conflicts, as opposed to those groups that lack such support and have only won 16.7% of
conflicts (2010).
State actors may be incentivized to provide support to secessionist groups due to a
number of factors. First, states may support rebels in an effort to undermine their rivals.
Since separatist groups have a tendency to weaken regional stability and norms of state
sovereignty, they can face difficulty in soliciting external support (Saideman 2002; Byman
et al. 2001a). Nonetheless, Saideman finds that separatist groups located in stronger states
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are more likely to receive support from other states due to the rivalry that characterizes
the interstate relationship (2002). Similarly, Maoz and San-Akca find that the existence of
an inter-state rivalry makes collaboration between violent substate actors and (rival) states
more likely (2012). Furthermore, states may benefit from separatists’ local demographic
and geographic knowledge, as well as lend credibility to the outside state sponsor’s in-
volvement in the intrastate conflict by providing an familiar and easily identifiable front
to the state’s activities (Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz 2008). Additionally, neighboring
states are likely to sponsor separatist groups if the host state (of the rebels) has supported
neighbors’ rebels in the past (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005).
Second, states may support separatist groups in pursuit of geostrategic interests. While
geostrategic interests are undoubtedly linked to the presence of rivalries between states,
these interests may cover a wider variety of issues, like economic concerns or domestic
security issues. Rather than ideological, cultural, ethnic, or religious factors, states opt to
aid these groups in pursuit of financial, political, or other strategic interests that will provide
low cost benefits to supporters (Heraclides 1990). Other strategic interests may include
accruing regional hegemony, triggering regime change, controlling the separatist group,
increasing national security, promoting irredentist activity (especially for separatist groups
with real or perceived nationalistic ties to the state supporter), and looting the separatist
group’s host state (Byman et al. 2001a). States’ pursuit of geostrategic objectives assumes
them to be rational. Regan suggests that states opt to intervene exclusively when they expect
success in their endeavors, the time to success is short, and domestic politics allow for the
possibility of intervention (2000). Indeed, states may even pursue strategic relationships
with violent substate actors in lieu of states when engaged in interstate conflict (Akca 2009).
Third, state actors may support groups interested in secession due to affinity over certain
issues, such as ethnicity or political ideology. For example, Byman et al. observe that
states undertake support of coreligionists or coethnics (2001a). Support of this nature,
however, is nuanced. For example, aid to coreligionists may be in the form of state tacit
acceptance of supportive activities by wealthy citizens, meaning aid to coethnics serves
as a guise under which stronger states can pursue international political objectives or a
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strategy to garner domestic support (Byman et al. 2001a). Similarly, the likelihood of
interstate violence increases with the presence of politically active minority groups in states
considering sponsoring foreign rebels (Davis and Moore 1997).
Separatist groups may receive military and nonmilitary benefits, which is likely to influ-
ence their turn to violent activity, from state support. I will first consider previous work on
military aid from states to nonstate armed groups. States that sponsor rebels are often will-
ing to train fighters, which may consist of teaching groups to use bombs or light weaponry,
or cooperate with rebels to execute attacks (Byman 2005). States may also directly provide
violent nonstate groups weapons or valuable intelligence that informs operations (Jenkins
1986). Another option to enhance the military capabilities of separatist groups is to provide
technical or logistical expertise that improves the quality of arms and administration of the
group (Byman 2013).
Nonmilitary support, which may be in the form of financial, political, diplomatic, or
protective aid, to secessionist groups by states is likely to increase these groups’ overall
efficacy and (possibly) their propensity for violence. State supporters may contribute fi-
nancially to separatist groups, either by direct monetary transfers or failing to stop money
laundering or finance flows from domestic actors inside the state to separatists elsewhere
(Byman 2013; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). States are also uniquely positioned to pro-
vide political or philosophical guidance by spurring political movements to take action (By-
man 2005). For example, Hezbollah, a violent nonstate armed group operating in southern
Lebanon, has cited the Iranian revolution as responsible, at least in part, for instigating the
group’s use of violence (Norton 2007). States may offer diplomatic backing to separatist
groups, which involves the use of a state’s political or military clout to promote a group’s
cause on the international stage (Byman 2005). Finally, states may inadvertently (or neg-
ligently) aid separatists by providing them with sanctuaries in their territory. Even though
states may face some costs for hosting violent substate actors, this also enables separatists’
supporters to obtain some bargaining power relative to the host state that proves worthwhile
to the state providing the safe haven (Bapat 2007). Separatists frequently take advantage
of such safe havens to avoid repression from the central state government and monopolize
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on the ability to organize for military action (Salehyan 2007). Salehyan contends that this
is particularly beneficial to rebels as they are able to increase their bargaining leverage by
raising information asymmetries and accruing credibility as a result of outside sources of
support (2007).
Of course, separatists that accept support from states also face certain costs in the form
of constraints on their range of choices and behavior. Horowitz notes that secessionist
groups may have less agency over their members and actions since state sponsors often have
their own limited, and possibly divergent, objectives in the conflict (1985). Additionally,
such support may weaken secessionist groups by dividing the movement into ideological
factions, lowering the incentives to forge alliances with other nonstate armed groups against
the state, and undermining loyalty to the rebels’ local leaders (Byman 2013). Weinstein
suggests another potential pitfall of state support: when state support is available, rebel
groups may be less dependent on the population and eventually alienate and possibly abuse
the civilians supposedly under their jurisdiction (2006). Finally, Carter argues that state
sponsors are actually less beneficial to nonstate armed groups than conventionally held
by scholars (2012). States, although they may be amenable to providing a safe haven or
resources, are ultimately unwilling to incur any of the consequences associated with this
aid and so be willing to give up information about such groups located in their territory
(Carter 2012).
A Theory of External Support
This section presents my argument and hypotheses that will be tested, analyzed, and
discussed in the following sections. Secessionist groups in some states may desire to seek
formal separation. Although the origin and level of this demand for separation may be
unknown, I assume the group will act upon this interest under the appropriate conditions.
These conditions may vary, but I argue that external actors and internal institutions con-
tribute to separatists’ choice to rebel. In pursuit of the goal of secession, the separatist
group may be willing to employ violent tactics. This threatens the traditional sovereign
authority and so the political stability of the state to which the secessionist group belongs.
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Fig. 1: Frequency of Groups Interested in Secession, 2004-2006
Walter asserts that separatist disputes are the type of conflict most likely to intensify
to the point of violence and the most difficult to resolve via negotiation between parties
(2009). Bargaining difficulties arise because states engage in reputation building to appear
resolute against potential future opposition and separatists hope that violence will force the
government to concede (Walter 2009). When the secessionist group believes the benefits
outweigh the costs of violence in this bargaining dynamic, separatists will engage in violent
activity against the state. For separatist groups, this choice to engage in violence is likely
to occur as the allocation of strength changes to favor the separatists instead of the state
(Morrow 1989). Such an increase in separatists’ capacity is likely when the groups receive
support from external actors.
Collier and Hoeffler define separatist groups as movements that have objectives of self-
determination and historical internal links that differentiate them from the mainstream pop-
ulation, which may be associated with colonial legacies (2006). These substate groups have
the goal of removing the group, and possibly the larger segment of the population repre-
sented by the group, from the polity as a whole. These sentiments are expressed via political
or violent activity in pursuit of secession. Some illustrations of what I consider to be a re-
cent wave of secessionism are the referenda held in Scotland and violent intrastate conflict
in Ukraine. Globally, 57.8% of ethnic minority groups exhibit some degree of secessionist
tendencies, as is illustrated by Figure 1.
10
Support from outside actors that enhances the capabilities of separatists is likely to influ-
ence the demand for secession. Horowitz asserts that the capacity of such a group to engage
in rebellious activity is contingent upon international actors’ choices (1985). The power
sharing framework in the state is likely to mediate the impact of such external support,
which is particularly useful to separatists because this aid may help balance the traditional
power asymmetries that exist between the government and nonstate actors. This support
from states may be material, political, or military in nature. Regardless of the different
types or goals of groups in conflict with the central state government, separatist groups
that enjoy external support are better off than groups without state sponsorship (Heraclides
1990). So, building on a large body of theoretical research, I contend that such external sup-
port is beneficial for separatist groups in terms of enhancing their ability to rebel (Saideman
2002; Horowitz 1985; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011).
External aid is likely to lead a separatist group to engage in violent rebellion for three
reasons. First, state support is likely to influence separatists’ decision to violently rebel
because it augments their capacity to use violence, which may result in negotiations with
preferable outcomes to those separatists would obtain otherwise (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman,
Rosenau and Brannan 2001b). Second, outside support increases separatists’ focus on for-
eign political actors that are not the home state or the population the separatists claim to
represent, which may lower inhibitions against alienating or injuring the people (Salehyan,
Siroky and Wood 2014). Third, separatist groups that receive support from state actors are
likely to feel increased legitimacy for their cause, and the resulting inflated confidence may
embolden separatists to take risks in pursuit of their goal of secession.
To account for the conditions under which separatists engage in violent rebellious activ-
ities, the institutional design present in the state also matters. If a state elects to share power
with a separatist group to prevent outbreak of conflict, it can provide a group with regional
autonomy or enact structures of complex power sharing at the central level of the national
government. State leaders’ decision to enact certain political institutions may be endoge-
nous to their perception of the threat of violent secession. When creating such institutions,
these leaders are likely considering the threat of secession from separatist groups within
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their own sovereign territory, rather than from possible foreign entities that may support
separatists. These institutional designs come under varying levels of strain when separatist
groups receive support from outside actors. Therefore, I contend that the political insti-
tutions present in the state and foreign support for separatist groups interact to influence
outbreak of violent secession.
According to theoretical contributions from past scholars, state support to separatist
groups should be more likely to spur conflict under certain institutional conditions than
others. Regional autonomy is the devolution of power from the central government to
regional actors that allows substate groups some degree of political independence (Lapidoth
1997). Regional autonomy, if implemented in areas facing secessionist threats, will increase
the salience of sectarian identities and potential for intrastate conflict. In the case of a
separatist group that possesses regional autonomy, the devolution of power is likely to be
associated with group elites that do not buy into the idea of the state. Mobilization costs
of rebellion for these groups that are geographically concentrated and imbued with some
administrative and political power will be less than the costs for groups that are dispersed
or not autonomous.
Regionally autonomous separatists that receive external support are likely to attempt to
violently secede from the state. Under regional autonomy, the commitment problem be-
tween the state and the separatist group is alleviated because the state sends a credible sig-
nal to not manipulate minority groups by more evenly distributing power between the group
and the state (Fearon 1998). With regional autonomy, then, minority groups should be more
secure and less likely to rebel. Inflows of external support interrupt this relationship and
change separatists’ incentives regarding rebellion because the security provided by regional
autonomy will no longer be sufficient to satisfy the demand for rebellion. Because such
groups increasingly rely on outside actors rather than their home state, inhibitions against
violence toward the mainstream population will decrease. This argument is formalized in
the following hypothesis:
H1: Outside support from state actors increases the likelihood of violent rebellion when
the state allows separatist groups to have regional autonomy.
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An alternative institutional design is complex power sharing, which involves vertical
and horizontal construction of state authority that may consist of strategies of autonomy,
consociationalism, guaranteed representation, and veto options for groups (2008). Accord-
ing to the majority of scholars, complex power sharing is effective for a state threatened
with secession because it reinforces national unity, compels separatists to have a stake in
domestic politics, and incentivizes separatist elites to cooperate with other societal elites
(Wolff 2009; McGarry 2008). A minority of scholars caution against assuming complex
power sharing to be a panacea in all contexts involving separatist groups. For example,
Sisk notes that, while power sharing works in some contexts, this arrangement has failed to
alleviate conflict in others (Sisk 1996).
While the majority of scholars assume complex power sharing to pacify rebellion, I
argue that state support to groups participating in arrangements of complex power sharing
is likely to spur violent rebellion. Roeder and Rothchild observe that certain rare circum-
stances are needed for complex power sharing to work: capacity of state government and
group elites to enforce negotiated agreements among the population, willingness and com-
mitment to negotiations among societal groups, relatively equivalent population growth,
increasing economic prosperity for all groups in the state, and international actors that help
implement power sharing (2005). Convergence of all these conditions is rare, meaning
this institution only succeeds and therefore can prevent violence in a narrow window of
contexts. In fact, complex power sharing is likely to engender conflict due to internal and
external factors. Within the state, elites of separatist groups will continue to fight for their
respective contentious issues. Under complex power sharing, however, these elites will be
armed with certain political tools, like the minority veto, that will make efforts to redress
their grievances more worthwhile. Similarly, states that contain groups interested in seces-
sion likely already operate with less capacity than otherwise; thus, governments are unlikely
to be able to adequately enforce negotiated settlements between societal groups.
External conditions are likely to further compound the agitating effects of complex
power sharing. As Roeder and Rothchild observe, external actors’ support of implemen-
tation of complex power sharing institutions is crucial to their success (2005). If outside
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actors, conversely, are not only refusing to support the state enacting complex power sharing
but also supporting separatists financially or materially, intrastate conflict is the likely result.
Additionally, as with regional autonomy, elites under complex power sharing still depend
on the groups with which they identify. So, inundation of external support to separatist
groups will heighten demand for rebellion and deincentivize elites’ cooperation with the
central government and elites from other societal groups. For example, consociationalism,
which shares several important elements with complex power sharing, failed in Lebanon
due to interventionist activity by neighboring states Syria and Israel, which encouraged
elite dissent and government failure (Seaver 2000). The lack of elite cooperation, due to
intrastate tension resulting from complex power sharing and involvement by foreign actors,
ultimately contributes to failure of complex power sharing and outbreak of violent rebellion.
This argument leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: External support to separatist groups involved in complex power sharing arrange-
ments is likely to provoke violent rebellion.
Data and Methods
Data
I will now discuss the data and methods I employ to test the hypotheses that arise from
my theory. I use data from the most recent Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project, which ag-
gregates data on 284 mobilized ethnic groups, for the dependent and independent variables
of interest in this analysis (Center for International Development and Conflict Management
N.d.). I opt to include only those groups that demonstrate separatist tendencies, as identi-
fied by the MAR Project. This cross-sectional dataset includes information on a number
of quantities of interest for this project, such as presence of violent rebellious activity. The
time period of the MAR data ranges from 2004 to 2006. The number of minority groups
identified as being inclined toward separatism is 163. The group is the unit of analysis,
which I create by collapsing the three years into one aggregate observation. This large sam-
ple is optimal for conducting statistical analyses and generalizing from the results. A brief
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overview of the major variables of interest for three separatist groups is displayed in Table
1.
Table 1: Major Variables of Interest in Dataset
Separatist Group Rebel Reg. Aut. Complex P.S. Sup. Sup. (Level) Pot. Ext. Sup.
Scots 0 0 1 0 0 1
Chechens 1 1 0 1 1 1
Palestinians 1 1 0 1 3 1
Table 2: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Models 1 and 2
Group Pop. Complex P.S. Reg.Aut. Sup. Repr. Sup.(Level) Econ.Discr.
Group Pop. 1 0.129 -0.121 -0.111 0.085 -0.106 0.026
Complex P.S. 0.129 1 -0.237 0.138 0.035 0.131 -0.181
Reg.Aut. -0.121 -0.237 1 -0.120 -0.065 -0.032 -0.157
Ext.Sup. -0.111 0.138 -0.120 1 0.133 0.808 0.088
Repr. 0.085 0.035 -0.065 0.133 1 0.177 0.240
Sup.(Level) -0.106 0.131 -0.032 0.808 0.177 1 0.059
Econ.Discr. 0.026 -0.181 -0.157 0.088 0.240 0.059 1
Table 2 displays correlation between independent and control variables in the first two
models. Table 3 displays correlation between independent and control variables in the third
model. As illustrated by Tables 2 and 3, very little correlation exists between the inde-
pendent variables of interest or the control variables in this analysis. In Table 2, which
references Models 1 and 2, correlation exists between external support and the index of ex-
ternal support. This is expected given that the index is an ordinal variable to operationalize
the level of support (material, political, or military) from state sponsors to the separatist
group. I do not employ these variables in the same model, so this is not problematic for
my analysis. Table 3 displays no problematic correlation between the variables included
in the linear model that deals with possible endogeneity issues by including a variable for
potential of outside support rather than presence of outside support.
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Table 3: Correlation between Independent and Control Variables in Model 3
Group Pop. Complex P.S. Reg.Aut. Repr. Pot.Sup. Econ.Discr.
Group Pop. 1 0.129 -0.123 0.087 0.124 0.025
Comples P.S. 0.129 1 -0.235 0.033 0.085 -0.180
Reg.Aut. -0.123 -0.235 1 -0.089 0.050 -0.172
Repr. 0.087 0.033 -0.089 1 0.124 0.251
Pot.Sup. 0.124 0.085 0.050 0.124 1 -0.030
Econ.Discr. 0.025 -0.180 -0.172 0.251 -0.030 1
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest for this analysis is violent rebellious activity by sep-
aratist groups against the government. In the original MAR dataset, this is an ordinal vari-
able, which increases with intensity of the violent activity from infrequent acts of terrorism
to full civil war. I am interested simply in whether the secessionist group opts to employ
violence against the state, so I recode the violent rebellion variable to be dichotomous. The
variable is coded positively if any form of violence by the secessionist group occurs. This
may include sporadic or sustained terrorism, local rebellions, varying levels of guerilla ac-
tivity, or civil war (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.).
As shown in Table 4, fewer groups engage in violent rebellious activity than do not.
Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Dependent Variable
Frequency of Separatist Groups Percentage of Separatist Groups
No Rebellion 96 59%
Rebellion 67 41%
Independent Variables
I argue that external support, provided by state actors, influences the likelihood of sep-
aratist groups to violently rebel. I operationalize this external support using two strategies.
First, I employ a dichotomous variable that is coded positively if a separatist group receives
any form of state support (Center for International Development and Conflict Management
N.d.). As displayed in Figure 2, more separatist groups receive some variant of support
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from states than do not. Second, I create an additive index ranging from 0 to 3. The value
of the variable increases as the separatist group receives additional forms of aid, including
political, material, or military, from state sponsors. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of
levels of state support for separatist groups. I expect both variables representing foreign
support to be positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession when the
separatists have regional autonomy or complex power sharing.
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Fig. 2: Independent Variables: Outside Support as Dichotomous and Ordinal Variables
Outside actors’ choice to provide support to separatists may be endogenous to separatist
groups’ demonstrated capacity for violence. So, I also include a variable to operationalize
the potential for separatist groups to receive external support. To measure the possibility of
support, I consider whether the separatist group exists in a country engaged in an interstate
rivalry. I employ a dichotomous variable to operationalize interstate rivalry presence.
First, I create a dichotomous variable for rivalry using the Militarized Interstate Dispute
(MID) dyadic dataset, which spans from 1993 to 2001 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004).
The dataset I use to test the hypotheses produced by my theoretical argument starts in 2004.
Goertz and Diehl assert that a rivalry exists if a pair of states use military force against
one another two to four times within a ten year period (1992). Given this proposition, I
have a period of eight years, from 1994-2001 in the MID dataset, to draw upon to create the
interstate rivalry variable. I require a state to have been engaged in at least two disputes with
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the same opponent state from 1994-2001. Starting the count in 1994 ensures that the rivalry
will still be intact by the time my own dataset starts (2004) given the ten year life span of
a rivalry according to Goertz and Diehl. So, if a state experiences at least two MIDs with
the same enemy from 1994-2001, I code the observation positively. As illustrated by Table
5, more separatist groups exist in states that are engaged in interstate rivalries. Therefore,
more separatist groups in my dataset have potential to receive state support than do not. As
with the variables that actually measure presence of external support, I expect this variable
to be positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession when separatist
groups have regional autonomy or complex power sharing.
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Independent Variable: Potential Outside Support
Frequency of Separatist Groups Percentage of Separatist Groups
No Potential Support 45 28%
Potential Support 118 72%
According to my theoretical framework, the effect of outside support on rebellion is
conditional on the government’s institutional framework. One such independent variable
of interest is whether the secessionist group had regional autonomy at any point between
2004 and 2006. This refers to whether the group has administrative authority, which is de-
fined as bureaucratic and political control of an autonomous region (Center for International
Development and Conflict Management N.d.). The MAR dataset coded this variable as di-
chotomous, and I employed this in my dataset, as well. As shown in Table 6, more groups
do not have regional autonomy than do. I expect that the presence of regional autonomy
will be positively and statistically significantly related to violent secession by groups with
outside support.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Independent Variables: Political Institutions
Frequency of Institution Percentage of Institution
Regional Autonomy 136 83%
27 17%
Complex Power Sharing 128 79%
35 21%
The second institutional variable relevant to my theory is complex power sharing. To
approximate complex power sharing arrangements, I consider whether the group has guar-
anteed representation in the central state government (Center for International Development
and Conflict Management N.d.). This operationalization of complex power sharing is jus-
tified based on scholars’ characterizations of such arrangements as involving guaranteed
representation, which is more easily identifiable due to the legal requirements associated
with guaranteed representation in states (Wolff 2009; Weller and Metzger 2008). In the
few cases in which separatist groups received both regional autonomy and guarantees of
representation at the state level, I identify the political institution as complex power sharing
rather than regional autonomy. This is valid because proponents of complex power sharing
do not rule out some degree of regional autonomy but do recognize the potentially damag-
ing impact of regional autonomy on state unity and the benefit of integration at the level of
the central government (Wolff 2009). Therefore, these two institutional designs are mutu-
ally exclusive.1 As illustrated by Table 6, more groups are not involved in complex power
sharing arrangements than are. I expect that outside support to separatist groups partici-
pating in complex power sharing will be positively and statistically significantly related to
rebellion.
1 These two institutional designs are mutually exclusive even though there is low correlation (-0.235) be-
tween the two variables representing regional autonomy and complex power sharing, as indicated in Tables
2 and 3. This occurs because there is overlap in the data for separatist groups that have neither regional au-
tonomy or complex power sharing, indicating that a segment of separatist groups exists in states that have not
enacted any political institutions to share power at all. A cross tabulation of these two variables is in Table 14
of the Appendix, which illustrates the overlap.
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Control Variables
I include some control variables on which to condition my independent variables of
interest. First, I include a measure of the population, recoded in millions of people, of the
group in the state (Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.).
This is necessary because the size of the separatist group is likely to have some impact
on the group’s ability to violently rebel, but the size of groups is outside the scope of my
theory. The summary statistics for this control variable can be seen in Table 7.2
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Continuous Control Variable
Minimum Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum
Group Population 29604 5033993 1210732 13985302 136697940
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Dichotomous Control Variable: Repression
Frequency of Separatist Groups Percentage of Separatist Groups
No Repression 52 32%
Repression 111 68%
I also include a second control variable of repression of the separatist group by the
government. To operationalize the variable for repression, I create a dichotomous mea-
sure of multiple variables. One such variable is repression of the group civilian population.
This population is identified as not participating in violent or nonviolent political activities
(Center for International Development and Conflict Management N.d.). Another variable
is repression of group members that participate in nonviolent collective action, like demon-
strations. The third variable is repression of group members involved in violent activities,
such as harassment or torture (Center for International Development and Conflict Manage-
ment N.d.). As shown in Table 8, more groups experience repression than do not. If any of
these types of repression occurred between 2004 and 2006 to members of the secessionist
2 The table displays actual population data rather than the recoded variable so that meaningful values are
presented.
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group, the observation for repression is positively coded. This is necessary for appropri-
ately analyzing the relationship between my dependent and independent variable of interest
because repression of any individuals in the group, including militant and civilian members,
is likely to have some effect on whether or not the group engages in violent rebellion.
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Fig. 3: Control Variable: Economic Discrimination
Last, I include an ordinal control variable for whether the secessionist group experiences
economic discrimination. The variable is coded as 0 if the group does not experience dis-
crimination economically (Center for International Development and Conflict Management
N.d.). The variable ranges between 1 and 4 as groups experience increasing levels of eco-
nomic discrimination, including poverty due to neglect, marginalization, social practices,
or political restrictions (Center for International Development and Conflict Management
N.d.). This variable is essential because it illustrates whether separatist groups must con-
tend with economic inequality on the national stage, which may influence their interest in
separating from the larger polity. The majority of separatist groups experience some degree
of economic discrimination, and the distribution of levels of discrimination is illustrated by
Figure 3.
Methods
To test the validity of my hypotheses that (1) external support to regionally autonomous
groups will spur violent rebellion and (2) outside support to separatist groups involved
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in complex power sharing is also likely to encourage violent secession, I employ three
generalized linear models using logistic regression. These models vary due to different
operationalizations that I have of my major independent variables. In this way, I am able to
more robustly test my theory. The first two models test the impact of political institutions
and the actual presence of support on likelihood of violent rebellion by separatist groups.
These models can be broadly specified as:
Violent Rebellion = β0 + β1Regional Autonomy + β2Complex Power Sharing+
β3External Support + β4Regional Autonomy*External Support+
β5Complex Power Sharing*External Support+
β6Group Population + β7Repression Index + β8Economic Discrimination + 
(1)
In the first and second models, I use the variables that measure the actual presence of out-
side support for the separatist group. In the first model, I use a dichotomous measure of
outside support illustrating whether any type of support was received. In the second model,
however, I use an additive index of external support that shows the level of support re-
ceived. The index for external support increases as the separatist group receives more types
of external support from states (political, material, or military).
The third model deals with possible endogeneity issues related to outside support and
rebellion. So, this model considers the influence of political institutions and the potential
for external support on onset of violent rebellion by secessionist groups. This model can be
broadly specified as:
Violent Rebellion = β0 + β1Regional Autonomy + β2Complex Power Sharing+
β3Potential of External Support+
β4Regional Autonomy*Potential of External Support+
β5Complex Power Sharing*Potential of External Support+
β6Group Population + β7Repression Index + β8Economic Discrimination + 
(2)
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I use interaction terms in these models because of the likely interactive nature of the effect
of existing political institutions and external support on outbreak of secessionist violence.
Specifically, the effect of external support on violent rebellion by separatists is likely to
be conditioned by the political institution (regional autonomy or complex power sharing)
established in the state hosting the separatist group. Similarly, the effect of political institu-
tions on outbreak of violence is likely to be conditioned by the presence of outside support
received by the separatists.
To deal with possible endogeneity issues between external support and onset of vio-
lent rebellion, I operationalize foreign support variables in two manners. In the first two
models, I specifically employ variables that show whether, and to what extent, separatist
groups receive support from foreign actors. In the third model, I include a variable, which
consists of evidence of interstate rivalry, that illustrates only the potential for outside sup-
port to rebel groups. Separatist groups present in host states that are involved in rivalries
with other states are likely to receive outside support from the hosts’ rivals in an effort to
undermine the host state (Maoz and SanAkca 2012; Salehyan 2007; Salehyan, Gleditsch
and Cunningham 2011). So, without testing whether states actually send aid (which could
depend on separatist groups already having credibly displayed their threat to engage in vi-
olence), I can appropriately test my hypotheses by using a variable measuring potential for
outside support. I expect the results of the third model, which includes potential of outside
support, to corroborate the results of the first two models, which employ actual presence of
external support.
Analysis
In this section, I will discuss the results of the statistical analyses used to test the va-
lidity of my hypotheses. The three models are similar except for the strategies I employ to
operationalize the variables to measure external support. In the first two models, I consider
the actual presence of foreign support. In the third model, I deal with possible endogeneity
problems concerning the relationship between outside aid and separatists’ use of violence
by considering potential (rather than actual existence of) support. The majority of the re-
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sults of the three models are similar. The results of this statistical analysis provide evidence
largely in support of the hypotheses derived from my theoretical framework.
I use three logistic regression models that include multiple interaction terms, so the
immediate results of the regressions are not extremely informative. I will, however, briefly
report the noteworthy results of the logistic regression models. The complete results of the
models are displayed in Table 12, which is in the Appendix. While not always statistically
significant across the three models, both variables representing power sharing institutions
are positively related to separatists’ likelihood to use violence. In the second model, which
employs an ordinal variable for external support, regional autonomy (even without external
support) is statistically significantly related to violent rebellion. Also in the second model,
the ordinal variable for outside support is positively and statistically significantly related
to rebellious activity. Repression is positive and statistically significant across all three
models, indicating that government repression of any member of the separatist group is
likely to be associated with secession. Last, the variable measuring group population is
positive and statistically significant in the second model.
As previously mentioned, I use several interaction terms in my three models; therefore,
I also present and interpret the marginal effects and predicted probabilities of these models.
I will now discuss the marginal effects of the first set of models, which considers the impact
of actual foreign support and political institution (regional autonomy or complex power
sharing) on outbreak of violent rebellion by secessionist groups. It should be noted that
the baseline to which I compare regionally autonomous groups is those groups that have
neither power sharing institutions3 or are involved in complex power sharing. Likewise,
the baseline to which I compare groups involved in complex power sharing is the category
of groups that have neither power sharing institution or have regional autonomy.4
3 A state lacking power sharing institutions for a separatist group does not imply that the group is operating
in a failed state. For example, in my dataset, a separatist group in South Africa would fall into this category.
There are 101 of these groups, as indicated by Table 14.
4 I also ran the model estimating the impact of complex power sharing against the baseline of regional
autonomy and vice versa. The results were largely similar across the various models.
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Table 9: Marginal Effects of External Support under Two Separate Institu-
tional Conditions
Political Institution External Support
Model 1 Regional Autonomy 2.03 (1.03) *
Complex Power Sharing 1.43 (0.70) *
Model 2 Regional Autonomy 1.24 (0.65) .
Complex Power Sharing 0.87 (0.58)
Political Institution Potential External Support
Model 3 Regional Autonomy 1.37 (0.71) *
Complex Power Sharing 1.17 (0.65) .
Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at p < .05
. indicates significance at p < 0.1
Table 9 displays the marginal effects of the interaction terms in Models 1, 2, and 3.
In Model 1, the interaction term between regional autonomy and outside support (as a
dichotomous variable) is positive and statistically significant. Additionally, in Model 2,
the interaction term between regional autonomy and foreign support, operationalized as an
ordinal variable, is positive and statistically significant.5 The marginal effects of the first
two models, therefore, strongly support my hypotheses because the interactions between
regional autonomy and outside support (as a dichotomous and as an ordinal variable) is
positively related to outbreak of violent rebellion by separatists. The interaction between
complex power sharing and outside support is also positively and statistically significantly
related to violent secession in Model 1 and positively (but not statistically significantly)
related to rebellion in Model 2. So, the marginal effects of the first two models provide
some support for my hypothesis regarding the positive impact of the interaction of complex
power sharing with external support on secession.
The third model, which I employ to check for endogeneity issues, also displays posi-
tive and statistically significant effects of the interactions between political institutions and
5 The interaction term in Model 2 is significant at the .057 level, meaning it is only slightly above the .05
statistical significant level and therefore remains important in the analysis of my models.
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potential outside support on violent rebellion. Like the first two models, the effect of the
interaction between regional autonomy and potential external support is positive and sta-
tistically significantly related to violent rebellion, which further confirms my hypothesis
regarding regional autonomy and aid from foreign actors. Also like the first model, the in-
teraction term between complex power sharing and potential external support is positively
and statistically significantly related to violent rebellious activity.6 This provides further
evidence in support of the second hypothesis regarding complex power sharing and outside
aid. The third model generally replicates the results of the first two models. This addresses
issues of endogeneity related to the impact of foreign support on the outbreak of violent
rebellion because the potential of outside support for the most part parallels the actual pres-
ence of external support.
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Fig. 4: Predicted Probabilities of Political Institutions and External Support (Model 1)
Because I employ logistic regression, I also present the predicted probabilities associ-
ated with each model in Table 13, which is located in the Appendix. In Model 1, both inter-
action terms achieve statistical significance, so I will interpret the substantive implications
6 The interaction term in Model 3 is significant at the .072 level, meaning it also is only marginally above
the .05 statistical significant level and therefore remains important in the analysis of my models.
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of this model by discussing a bar chart associated with its probabilities, presented in Figure
4. As I previously mentioned, the baseline of comparison for groups that have regional
autonomy is groups without any power sharing institutions or those with complex power
sharing. Similarly, the baseline of comparison for groups participating in complex power
sharing is groups lacking power sharing institutions or regionally autonomous groups. Be-
cause of the dichotomous variables of interest included in the first model, I display the
results in a bar chart in Figure 4. Separatist groups with regional autonomy that also receive
outside support are more likely to engage in violent secession than regionally autonomous
separatist groups that do not receive outside support, as indicated by the relative height of
the blue bar to the yellow bar in Figure 4. The same holds true for groups involved in com-
plex power sharing. The solid black lines indicate uncertainty around the point estimates.
For example, there is more certainty on the estimate for groups participating in complex
power sharing arrangements that receive external support. Generally, this substantive anal-
ysis is supportive of both hypotheses.
I present the predicted probabilities associated with Model 2, which includes an ordinal
independent variable of interest, in Figure 5. In this model, the interaction term between
regional autonomy and external support achieves statistical significance, so I will substan-
tively interpret this by considering associated predicted probabilities. Figure 5 illustrates
the effect of outside support and regional autonomy on the likelihood of rebellious vio-
lence. Since probability can only range from 0 to 1, the Y-axis, which has the “Predicted
Probability of Rebelling, is bounded between 0 and 1. External support, which is an inde-
pendent variable in the model I am estimating, can range from 0 to 3 since this variable is
ordinal. This is why the X-axis, which shows outside support, varies between 0 and 3.
As illustrated by the rising solid lines (indicating the point estimates), as outside support
increases, so does the likelihood of engaging in violent rebellion. This is supportive of the
first hypothesis generated by my theory. Regional autonomy is another variable that may
have an impact on the likelihood of separatist groups’ participation in violent rebellion.
So, when a separatist group is granted regional autonomy, the likelihood that the group
violently rebels increases. This is shown by the solid red line, which indicates regional
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Fig. 5: Predicted Probability of Rebellion Given Regional Autonomy and External Support (Model
2)
autonomy for a group, being associated with a higher probability of rebelling than the solid
blue line, which indicates a lack of regional autonomy. The dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence intervals for these estimates. The 95% confidence intervals indicate that, in
repeated sampling, 95% of the intervals calculated would contain the population mean.7
I present the predicted probabilities associated with the third model in Figure 6. Figure
6 shows the predicted probability of outbreak of rebellious violence given political institu-
tions and potential of foreign support (using the MID rivalry variable for potential external
support). As with Figure 4, I display these predicted probabilities using a bar chart be-
cause the models include dichotomous variables. Regionally autonomous groups with the
potential to receive outside support are more likely to rebel than groups that have regional
autonomy but lack external support potential. Separatist groups participating in complex
7 As indicated by Table 9, only the interaction of regional autonomy and external support achieves statisti-
cal significance in Model 2. I acknowledge that the interaction between complex power sharing and external
support is not statistically significant in this model. However, I include the predicted probability of rebellion
given complex power sharing and external support to indicate the substantive implications of this condition for
separatists in Figure 7 in the Appendix. The likelihood of engaging in violent rebellion increases as external
support from states increases. When separatists are involved in arrangements of complex power sharing with
the state, the probability that groups will engage in violent secession increases.
28
Political Institution
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 V
io
le
nt
 R
eb
el
lio
n
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Regional Autonomy Complex P.S.
l
l
l
l
No Potential External Support
Potential External Support
Fig. 6: Predicted Probabilities of Political Institutions and Potential External Support (Model 3)
power sharing governments with potential to receive outside support are similarly more
likely to violently secede than those without such potential external aid. This parallels the
findings related to the impact of actual support and political institutions on the likelihood of
violent secession (from Models 1 and 2). Again, this provides support for my hypotheses
and deals with possible endogeneity issues between support and rebellion.
Table 10: Variance Inflation Factors for Models 1, 2, and 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Regional Autonomy 1.90 1.91 4.72
Complex Power Sharing 2.89 2.28 3.90
External Support 1.55 1.54 1.46
Group Population 1.15 1.14 1.10
Repression 1.05 1.06 1.04
Economic Discrimination 1.22 1.18 1.17
Regional Autonomy:External Support 1.76 1.93 4.78
Complex Power Sharing:External Support 3.00 2.39 4.20
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Finally, I conduct some diagnostic tests to evaluate the performance of my models. In
addition to the tests for problematic correlation (in Tables 2 and 3), I calculate variance
inflation factors, which indicate how serious of a problem multicollinearity is, for the three
models. As indicated by Table 10, the VIF levels are not above 5, which is recommended
(Rogerson 2001). Lower levels of VIF are preferred because the VIF shows the size of
the inflation of standard errors that are due to multicollinearity. Also, Herron recommends
calculating an expected percent correctly predicted as an alternative to simply the percent
correctly predicted, which may imply more precision of estimates than is correct (Herron
1999). As illustrated by Table 11, the majority of the predictions were correctly predicted
in all three models.
Table 11: Expected Percent Correctly Predicted for Models 1, 2, and 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted (ePCP) 0.70 0.60 0.59
Discussion
In this section, I present the substantive implications of this statistical analysis for my
theory, possibilities for further scholarship, and relevant policy recommendations. The re-
sults of the statistical analysis provide broad support for the propositions stemming from my
theory. I find a positive, statistically significant relationship between the regional autonomy-
external (or potential external) support interaction term and violent secession in all three
models. This strongly supports my first hypothesis, which predicts that outside support to
regionally autonomous separatist groups will contribute to their use of rebellious violence.
Additionally, the estimate for the impact of the interaction between complex power sharing
and outside support on violent rebellion is positive and statistically significant in two of
three models. This provides some evidence for my second hypothesis, which suggests that
outside support is likely to influence separatist groups involved in complex power sharing
to violently secede. This analysis indicates that regional autonomy and complex power
sharing, commended by scholars and policymakers for allowing opportunities for repre-
sentation, do not necessarily mitigate rebellion under specific conditions, like provision of
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external aid to participating substate groups.
As previously discussed, the interaction between regional autonomy and external sup-
port is positively and statistically significantly related to outbreak of violent secession across
the three models. This empirical finding supports my theory and is intuitively logical. Sep-
aratists granted regional autonomy are likely well positioned to violently rebel, and these
groups will be further enabled and emboldened by receiving support from state actors. Such
outside aid is likely to improve separatists’ logistical capabilities, as well as to provide le-
gitimacy for their goals of self determination from established actors in the international
community.
Furthermore, this positive, statistically significant relationship is present in the first two
models, which include variables for outside support indicating separatists’ actual reception
of aid from states, and in the third model, which includes a variable for outside support
indicating the mere potential of separatist groups to receive outside aid. Because this rela-
tionship is constant across all three models, I can fairly confidently reject the null hypothesis
that the interaction between external support and regional autonomy is unrelated to outbreak
of violent rebellion. Additionally, the relative stability of this finding across the three mod-
els, which include both presence of actual support and potential for such aid, addresses the
possible endogeneity problem regarding external support and secessionist violence.
The findings related to complex power sharing and outside support are largely consis-
tent with my theoretical predictions. In the three models, which indicate actual presence of
and potential for outside support, the interaction of complex power sharing and external aid
is positively related to violent rebellion, but only statistically significant in the first and third
models. So, my statistical analysis produces some evidence in support of my second hy-
pothesis. Conventional wisdom on complex power sharing praises this institution as a cure
all for divided societies (Wolff 2009; Weller and Metzger 2008). Nonetheless, complex
power sharing is still likely to provide enabling conditions for separatist groups, especially
those receiving aid from outside actors, to violently rebel. This is likely due to some com-
bination of the internal and external factors that increase separatist group members’ interest
in rebellion and make elite cooperation challenging.
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This analysis also provides one unexpected, though not illogical, insight. The three
models indicate that, as repression against any member of the group increases, separatists
are more likely to engage in rebellious violence. This is unsurprising given that repres-
sion, regardless of against whom it is directed, spreads general grievance throughout the
group and may spark violence. This variable is not specifically included in my theoretical
framework, which focuses on the impact of power sharing structures and foreign support
on intrastate conflict. The possibility that repression lowers inhibitions against violence and
positively influences rebellion, however, is reasonable.
Future work in the study of the impact of external support and power sharing institutions
on violent rebellion will be improved by theoretical and methodological expansion. For ex-
ample, I do not consider aid from non-state actors, such as nongovernmental organizations
or transnational terrorist groups, in this analysis. Support from such groups, conditional
on the political institution present in the state, may influence whether separatists employ
violence in rebellion. So, including this in future work may present a more complete story
regarding the internal and external factors influencing secessionist violence. Additionally,
this study involves some endogeneity issues between the power sharing institution estab-
lished in the state, the decision by outside actors to support separatists, and the use of
violence by separatist groups. To deal with some of these issues, I include a third model
that operationalizes outside support simply as potential for aid from foreign actors (mea-
suring whether the separatist group’s home state is involved in a rivalry with another state).
When more nuanced data become available, the ideal statistical analysis would include a
time series that could deal with some of these endogeneity issues, as well.
The findings of this analysis are informative to academics, by contributing to the larger
debates on the impact of outside support and power sharing on secessionist violence, and
policymakers, by providing knowledge of techniques that may stabilize divided societies
and reduce political violence. This analysis represents a unique test of hypotheses regarding
what types of governing structure and external aid are most likely to provide the conditions
favorable to violent rebellion by groups interested in seceding from the larger polity. While
the majority of scholars contend that complex power sharing is the preferred method by
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which to integrate separatists, this study suggests that complex power sharing, like regional
autonomy, may incite violent rebellion, especially when external actors become involved.
So, I, along with a very few other scholars, argue against viewing complex power sharing
as a panacea for states facing secessionist threats. For policymakers, the substantive results
are also important. This analysis serves to caution those policymakers that would enact
complex power sharing and expect an automatic reduction in violent rebellion. Indeed,
when separatist groups receive outside support, regional autonomy and complex power
sharing produce similar probabilities of intrastate conflict. Thus, more work is needed to
establish what conditions are most likely to reduce separatist violence.
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APPENDIX
Table 12: Logistic Regression Results of Models 1, 2, and 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Intercept) -5.09∗ -5.52∗ -5.00∗
(1.16) (1.18) (1.18)
Regional Autonomy 0.86 1.64∗ 0.95
(0.83) (0.81) (1.27)
Complex Power Sharing 0.33 0.58 0.60
(0.89) (0.81) (1.02)
External Support 0.03
(0.51)
Group Population 0.06 0.08∗ 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Repression 4.44∗ 4.42∗ 4.43∗
(1.07) (1.07) (1.06)
Economic Discrimination 0.20 0.17 0.19
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Regional Autonomy: External Support 1.17
(1.29)
Complex Power Sharing: External Support 1.09
(1.11)
External Support (Level) 0.58∗
(0.28)
Regional Autonomy: External Support (Level) -0.40
(0.61)
Complex Power Sharing: External Support (Level) 0.30
(0.65)
Potential External Support -0.02
(0.55)
Regional Autonomy: Potential External Support 0.43
(1.42)
Complex Power Sharing: Potential External Support 0.57
(1.20)
N 158 162 162
AIC 159.06 158.53 165.25
BIC 269.32 269.69 276.41
logL -43.53 -43.27 -46.63
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 13: Predicted Probabilities of Violent Rebellion by External Support and Po-
litical Institutions
Regional Autonomy Complex Power Sharing
No External Support
Model 1 0.66 0.54
Model 2 0.66 0.61
Model 3 0.66 0.61
External Support
Model 1 0.84 0.77
Model 2 0.76 0.73
Model 3 0.77 0.73
Table 14: Cross Tabulation of Regional Autonomy and Complex Power Sharing
No Political Institutions Complex Power Sharing
No Political Institutions 101 35
Regional Autonomy 27 0
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